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beings among others, but of contingencies concerning “us” human beings. He
urges that the only way in which we can ultimately come to terms with such
contingencies is through some kind of religious hope: hope “in a non-contingent
structure that grounds our human existence, and underlies our moral aspirations” (38). For Williams, there is no such hope. Williams has an acute sense,
as Cottingham reminds us, that humanity and the world are simply not made
for each other (35).
Martha Nussbaum laments the way in which, as she sees it, Williams’s resultant pessimism leads both philosophically and personally to a cynical disengagement from the world and its contingencies; in particular, from those of the
world’s contingencies which, though intolerable, are rectifiable. As far as the
philosophical issue is concerned, I think that Nussbaum seriously underestimates
Williams’s theoretical commitment to political activity. As far as the personal
issue is concerned, I think that she seriously underestimates his practical commitment to it (see especially 239, n. 33). As Sharon Krause points out at the
very end of her essay—despite having earlier voiced similar misgivings (281)—
“[Williams] has given us valuable resources for correcting the present absence
of political agency in political theory today” (282).
There is far more to be said about this than I can say here. But perhaps I
can be excused the following rather cheap point against Nussbaum, which, for
all its cheapness, does, I believe, get near to the heart of the matter: when
Williams disparages “the tireless aim of moral philosophy to make the world
safe for well-disposed people” (The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy, ed. Myles Burnyeat [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006],
59), and when Nussbaum retorts by asking rhetorically, “What . . . is wrong with
trying to ‘make the world safe for well-disposed people’—where this means, in
concrete terms, trying to make sure that every child gets decent nutrition, . . .
and so forth?” (220), she forgets the subject of Williams’s verb. He is making a
point about philosophy. He is concerned with what Cottingham aptly dubs “those
‘limits of philosophy’ which are the implicit and explicit theme of so much of
[his] work” (37). Certainly we must try to make sure that every child gets decent
nutrition. What we must not try to do, as Williams rightly insists, is to use
philosophy to justify their starving to death.
Williams’s admonishments against the pretentions of philosophy have always
been complemented by a powerful sense of its potential and by the encouragement that he offers others to realize that potential. This is not least through
the example of his own work. This volume is a wonderful reminder of that
example.
A. W. Moore
St. Hugh’s College Oxford

Frierson, Patrick R. Freedom and Anthropology in Kant’s Moral Philosophy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 211. $76.00 (cloth).
Can the social sciences contribute to Kantian moral theory? Are Kantians committed to claiming that empirical findings—though interesting in other ways—
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are not morally relevant? If they do take empirical findings to be morally relevant,
are they then committed to rejecting Kant’s view about a free self which is
independent from empirical determination? These are in essence the important
and timely questions that Frierson pursues in this work. They arise with special
force for Kantians who are committed to a duality in human beings between
how we appear and how we are independent of all experience. This duality is
what allows for the Kantian view in which the natural world is determined by
scientific laws, while human beings are free and morally responsible. Frierson
notes that although these questions are especially pressing for Kantians, they
also arise for any moral theory “that takes seriously a strong, nondeterministic
conception of human freedom as a condition of moral responsibility while at
the same time recognizing the obvious importance of helps and hindrances to
moral development” (95). Frierson discusses recent Kantian attempts to deal
with these issues—by Barbara Herman, Nancy Sherman, Felicitas Munzel, and
Robert Lauden—but concludes that all of them fail because they sacrifice either
the moral relevance of empirical influences or Kant’s conception of freedom.
Frierson’s difficult project is to show that one need not choose between the
two, that one can make sense of a Kantian view in which empirical findings are
morally relevant while holding on to Kant’s conception of freedom. Frierson’s
defense of the importance of the project is very compelling. However, I find his
attempt to answer these questions less than fully successful.
Frierson’s book has an elegant, familiar, structure: he presents three apparently inconsistent claims which all seem to be true, he argues that other
philosophers concerned with these issues end up denying one of them, and he
attempts to provide a way to reconcile them. This structure is familiar from, for
example, Donald Davidson’s “Mental Events” (in his Essays on Actions and Events
[Oxford: Clarendon, 2001], 207–28) and Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Part 1 of Frierson’s book sets up the problem and
discusses other solutions to it, while part 2 develops his own solution. At 166 pages
of main text (not including notes and bibliography), the book is relatively short
and straightforward; however, the argumentation is complex and substantial.
The problem occupying Frierson dates back to Schleiermacher’s review of
Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. In his review, “Schleiermacher
sarcastically suggests that Kant’s Anthropology must have been intended as a ‘negation of all anthropology’ . . . because it blatantly conflicts with the rest of
Kant’s philosophy” (1). Following Schleiermacher, Frierson argues that, in the
Anthropology, Kant takes anthropological insights to be both empirical and morally relevant. The question is, how can Kant take empirical findings to be morally
relevant, given that one’s moral status is supposed to be based on one’s intelligible self, which is not determined by anything empirical? Frierson sets up the
problem as “a conflict among three claims to which Kant seems committed”:
(i) “human beings are transcendentally free, in the sense that empirical influences can have no effect on the moral status of a human being and in the sense
that choice is fundamentally prior to natural determination”; (ii) “moral anthropology is an empirical science that studies empirical influences on human
beings”; and (iii) “moral anthropology is morally relevant, in that it describes
influences on moral development” (2). Each of the first three chapters of Frierson’s book is devoted to defending one of these claims.
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In the first chapter, Frierson argues for an asymmetry in Kant’s view of
freedom: free choices can affect the natural world but are themselves independent from empirical determination. In arguing for this interpretation, Frierson
stays neutral on whether Kant’s distinction between things in themselves and
appearances is best interpreted as a distinction between two types of things, the
two-object view, or as a distinction between two different ways of thinking about
things, the two-perspective view. He discusses each of the views in turn and argues
that Kant is committed to the asymmetry of the relationship on both readings.
On the two-object view, the asymmetry is that “the free self can influence but
cannot be influenced by the empirical world.” On the two-perspective view, “one
might say that the empirical perspective on the self cannot play a fundamental
role within the practical perspective, whereas the practical perspective is necessary in order to complete the empirical one” (31). On either view, it is this
asymmetry which allows for moral responsibility—we are responsible for our
free choices, and our moral status depends on these free choices.
The next two chapters are focused on defending the next two claims: that
Kant’s moral anthropology is empirical and that Kant took some anthropological
discoveries to be morally relevant in the sense that they can affect one’s moral
status. According to Frierson, Kant took anthropology to be empirical both in
method and in subject matter. Kant’s anthropology studies the empirical character of human beings, and it uses as sources one’s inner experience, observations of others, and works of fiction. The aim is to make claims that apply to
all human beings, making anthropological claims contingent but universal (if
a certain claim is found not to be universal, it needs to be revised until one is
found that applies more broadly). On Frierson’s view, Kant’s mature moral
anthropology “deals specially with subjective conditions that spread and
strengthen rather than merely specify, moral principles. That is, moral anthropology studies the influences that help or hinder one in adopting and acting
on moral principles” (49). Although Frierson’s book is not focused on giving
an account of Kant’s particular anthropological claims, he does discuss some
examples of the kinds of claims that moral anthropology deals with: politeness
and strength of character are helps to the development of a good will, while
passions and affects are hindrances. Other helps that Frierson cites but does
not discuss in detail are “education, a republican government, world peace, and
the development of arts and sciences” (67). Frierson makes a prima facie convincing case that for Kant there is such a thing as moral anthropology, which
brings out the central question of the book: how can Kant’s views on moral
anthropology be reconciled with his theory of freedom and moral responsibility?
Frierson discusses four other attempts to reconcile Kant’s anthropological
insights with the rest of his moral views. Each of these attempts assigns a different
role to moral anthropology. First, empirical influences can play an epistemic
role by helping to determine “the context, relevance, or proper application of
the moral law in concrete situations.” Second, empirical influences can play “an
instrumental role in carrying out the demands of morality. That is, they can
provide the resources that one can use to do more good deeds.” Third, empirical
influences can be constitutive of a good will “such that to have character, or to
be polite, or to be part of a good community, is part of what it is to be good”
(69). Fourth, empirical influences can be helpful or necessary propaedeutics
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for having a good will—they could aid someone in becoming morally responsible
or “they could serve as basic requirements for someone to be morally responsible
at all, such that to lack such aids would preclude choosing good or evil” (79).
With respect to the first three roles, he discusses the views of Barbara Herman
(who argues for the first) and Nancy Sherman (whom Frierson interprets as
holding either the second or third) and argues that although they succeed in
allowing that empirical influences can play some role in Kantian ethics, they
fail to show how empirical influences can be morally relevant. With respect to
the last role, he discusses Robert Louden’s and Felicitas Munzel’s views and
argues that although they allow that anthropology is morally relevant, they end
up disregarding Kant’s views on freedom. He concludes that “recent attempts
to make sense of those helps and hindrances either deny their full moral significance or sacrifice Kant’s strong conception of freedom” (95).
Frierson’s solution depends on his characterization of the relationship between one’s free will and one’s appearances in the world as one of expression:
“changes in the empirical will are morally relevant as expressions of the moral
status of the free will” (95; emphasis added). For Kant, one’s moral status depends on acting with respect for the moral law, and Frierson argues that “although neither one’s maxim nor one’s commitment to the moral law is itself
an appearance, both are directed towards appearances” (98). Because the imperatives are directed toward appearances, “action in appearance that conforms
to certain standards characterizes the good free will” (97). Thus, according to
Frierson, “moral anthropology is morally relevant because it describes aspects
of human life that are important expressions of a good human will” (96). Even
though one’s moral status depends on the form of one’s maxims, in making
decisions we are concerned with doing something, and what we do is part of
our empirical self. For example, when we decide to keep a promise, we intend
to act in a certain way, and how we act is part of how we appear and thus subject
to empirical influences. So, one cares morally about one’s appearance in the
world because “it is by being a certain sort of appearance that one shows oneself
to be a certain sort of free agent” (98).
Unfortunately, it is not fully clear what this expression relationship is or
how it helps to solve the problem that the book is concerned with. Before turning
to what Frierson has to say about expression, let me pose an apparent dilemma
that Frierson somehow needs to evade using his account of expression. Whatever
the expression relationship is exactly, it would seem that either one’s moral
status depends on successfully expressing oneself in the realm of appearances
as a good person, in which case the empirical influences of helps and hindrances
can affect one’s moral status by affecting one’s expression, or else one’s moral
status is dependent solely on one’s free self outside the realm of appearances,
in which case the empirical influences of helps and hindrances cannot affect
one’s moral status. The first option is subject to Frierson’s critique of Herman
and Sherman, while the second is subject to his critique of Louden and Munzel.
So Frierson needs his expression relationship to do the serious work of opening
up some third option here.
Given how central this is to his book, Frierson says surprisingly little about
what the relationship is like. In the crucial passage, he writes,
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It is important to note here that the term expression is used in the sense in
which one expresses oneself through the clothes one wears, or the music
to which one listens. This sort of self-expression is not the revealing of an
already determined nature. One becomes the self one is through self-expression. In the moral case this is true as well. When one expresses one’s
goodness by refraining from false promising out of a sense of duty, one
does not merely show a goodness that was “already there.” Instead, having
a good will is a matter of choosing in certain ways. Refraining from false
promises, when this flows from respect for the moral law, is a choice of the
morally praiseworthy sort. By choosing in this way, one expresses one’s moral
status in the sense that one chooses to be a morally good person. (99)
The language in this passage makes it sound like the relationship is such that
one’s empirical expression is (partially) constitutive of having a good will. But
Frierson criticizes Sherman for precisely this view, so this cannot be what he
intends. What he does intend I am not fully sure.
The issue is further complicated by Kant’s claim that we don’t have epistemic
access to the free self, only to the empirical self, in which case any inference
from the nature of the latter to the nature of the former seems problematic to
say the least. This idea is familiar from the Groundwork, where Kant emphasizes
the problem with trying to determine what the free self is like from appearances.
How can we know what the “expression” relationship is like given that we don’t
have access to one of the relata?
In attempting to deal with some of these issues, Frierson turns to Kant’s
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Ultimately his solution to the problem
of the book seems to rely on some of Kant’s most problematic claims. I won’t
go into Frierson’s full argument here, as it is complex, but the general idea he
pursues is that although we can’t know much about the free self, we can know
that we are evil. Frierson argues that on Kant’s view, we could never know
whether we are good (because even good actions may be grounded on evil
motives and we are prone to self-deception), but we can know that we are not
(because actions contrary to right can never be good). In addition, we have a
propensity to evil (a potential to deviate from the moral law). “People are radically evil, such that they not only act on evil maxims but also establish in
themselves a propensity to evil which ensures that future choices will be made
against the moral law” (113). This propensity does not affect one’s empirical
self but rather one’s free self. It is essential that a good will fight this propensity
and find ways to change, but doing so requires that we know the ways in which
we are affected by the empirical world. “Whereas one might have thought that
one need only do good now to express a good will, one finds that one must act
in such a way that one will combat the propensity to evil and promote good
deeds in the future. One’s deliberation is always about what to do now, but
moral anthropology provides the means for extending the effects of deliberation
beyond the present” (132). If I can make sense of Frierson’s view at all, he is
saying that we should be morally concerned with the results of moral anthropology because being a good person requires acting well in the world. Moral
anthropology allows us to cultivate the kind of empirical will which will act well
in the future. And yet appearances do not affect one’s moral status at all, so
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whether one actually succeeds in shaping one’s empirical will is not something
that is morally relevant.
Frierson’s book promises to bring Kantian ethics together with empirical
studies of human nature. This is a very interesting and promising project, and
the book is recommended for the challenge it presents to Kantian ethics. However, that his proposed solution to the book’s central problem involves Kant’s
notion of human beings as radically evil and grace as a way of overcoming evil
figures to be unsatisfying to many readers. I have doubts that Frierson has
succeeded in reconciling the moral relevance of empirical findings with Kant’s
theories of freedom and moral responsibility. But even if he had been successful,
given that his attempt at reconciliation depends so crucially on such problematic
aspects of Kant’s view, I wonder whether Kantians are not better off either giving
up the idea that empirical findings can be morally relevant or modifying Kant’s
theory of freedom.
Ariela Tubert
University of Puget Sound

Haybron, Daniel M. The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 357. $55.00 (cloth).
The Pursuit of Unhappiness is not your regular philosophy book. First, it is a
passionate manifesto, not just for a new theory or a new approach but for a new
field called “prudential psychology,” which should, Daniel Haybron argues, become a central concern of academia. To inaugurate it, Haybron proposes original
accounts of happiness and well-being and demonstrates their dramatic consequences for political philosophy, policy, and our view of human nature. Along
with providing empirically informed and historically aware top-notch philosophy,
the book takes the reader on an emotionally charged journey. Also remarkable
is the scope of the discussion, which ranges from philosophical methodology
and metaethics to social science and policy. Finally, the variety and wealth of
sources Haybron marshals to develop and illustrate his claims are astonishing:
newspaper quotes collected over many years, full of striking, subtle, and moving
sketches of human life; poetry; novels; film; economics; psychology; anthropology; and, of course, the Stoics, Epicurus, Aristotle, and Mill.
The main source of inspiration and perspective is an actual small fishing
island, which Haybron describes vividly but does not name. Life on this island,
although not easy, was an example of a near-perfect fit between human nature
and environment. By comparison to it, the life of most contemporary Americans—
stressed, isolated, confined—comes across as “junk reality” (26). Haybron describes the two ways of life, with their dramatically different economic, environmental, and psychological costs, so powerfully that no additional motivation for
his project is needed. What should happiness feel like? Would we be able to
tell? Are we sensible people? Should anyone want to inherit our civilization? If
these questions are at all pressing, this book is worth reading.
For a long time, philosophical discussions of happiness—a descriptive notion, rather than the evaluative ‘well-being’—assumed that it is not very com-

